Civil Liberties: Employment Discrimination, Due Process, Immunities, and Exhaustion of Remedies by Meites, Thomas R. & Flaxman, Kenneth N.
Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 56 | Issue 1 Article 6
April 1980
Civil Liberties: Employment Discrimination, Due
Process, Immunities, and Exhaustion of Remedies
Thomas R. Meites
Kenneth N. Flaxman
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please
contact dginsberg@kentlaw.iit.edu.
Recommended Citation
Thomas R. Meites & Kenneth N. Flaxman, Civil Liberties: Employment Discrimination, Due Process, Immunities, and Exhaustion of
Remedies , 56 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 73 (1980).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol56/iss1/6
CIVIL LIBERTIES: EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, DUE
PROCESS, IMMUNITIES, AND EXHAUSTION OF
REMEDIES
THOMAS R. MEITES*
KENNETH N. FLAXMAN**
During its 1978-79 term, the Seventh Circuit followed an increas-
ingly common practice when, in more than half its cases, I it released its
decisions as "unpublished opinions" under Seventh Circuit Rule 35.2
The rule purports to prohibit the publication 3 or citation4 of the "rule
35 opinion," which is assertedly "non-precedential." 5 Putting aside the
questions whether a court of appeals has the power to deprive its deci-
sions of precedential value,6 whether rule 35 exceeds the rulemaking
* Partner, Meites, Flaxman & Frackman, Chicago, Illinois. Member, Illinois bar; A.B.,
J.D., Harvard University.
I* Partner, Meites, Flaxman & Frackman, Chicago, Illinois. Member, Illinois bar; B.EE..,
City University of New York; J.D., Illinois Institute of Technology/Chicago-Kent College of
Law.
I. In calendar year 1978, the Seventh Circuit decided 1,126 cases by opinion. THE JUDICIAL
BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 8 (1979). The court does
not release statistics to distinguish between published and Circuit Rule 35 "unpublished orders."
1d. An examination of the advance sheets for 591 F.2d through 601 F.2d shows that of the 459
decisions coming from the Seventh Circuit, 265, or 57.8%, were by "unpublished order." Twenty-
eight of the "unpublished orders," or a total of 10.6% of all "unpublished orders," reversed the
decision or order before the court.
2. 7TH CiR. R. 35 is typical of the "unpublished opinion" rules which have been promul-
gated by each of the circuits. See Reynolds & Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent-Limited
Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1167,
1207-08 (1978) (circuit by circuit comparison of unpublished opinion rules) [hereinafter referred
to as Reynolds & Richman].
3. 7TH CiR. R. 35(b)(2)(iii) provides that unpublished orders:
Shall be available for listing periodically in the Federal Reporter showing only title,
docket number, date, district or agency appealed from with citation of pnor opinion (if
reported) and the judgment or operative words of the order, such as "affirmed," "en-
forced," "reversed," "reversed and remanded," and so forth.
4. 7TH CIR. R. 35(b)(2)(iv) provides that unpublished orders:
Except to support a claim of res judicata, collateral estoppel or law of the case, shall not
be cited or used as precedent (a) in any federal court within the circuit or in any written
document or in oral argument or (b) by any such court for any purpose.
5. See, e.g., United States v. Erving, 388 F. Supp. 1011, 1017 (W.D. Wis. 1975) (Court refus-
ing to consider an unpublished order, even when "[n]o other relevant decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has been cited by counsel, nor am I aware of any.")
Unpublished opinions, however, have been cited to the United States Supreme Court by the
Solicitor General to support a claim of a conflict among the circuits to justify the grant of a
petition for writ of certiorari. See United States v. Addonizio, Pet. for Writ of Cert., O.T. 1978,
No. 78-156 at 17 (citing three unpublished opinions to support claim of conflict among the cir-
cuits). Cf. Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975) (resolving intra-circuit conflict between deci-
sions reached in published and unpublished opinions).
6. In Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975), the Court held that whenever its appellate,
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powers vested in a court of appeals by 28 U.S.C. § 207 1,7 or whether
the rule is an unconstitutional prior restraint of first amendment
rights,8 the Seventh Circuit's frequent use of rule 35 means that its pub-
lished opinions generally concern 9 those issues which the court of ap-
peals deems important. An author may be the least reliable critic of his
own work, '0 and it is likely that important issues lurk among the deci-
sions issued under rule 35 opinions. " This article, however, deals only
with those Seventh Circuit published opinions touching upon civil lib-
erties in four areas: procedural due process,' 2 employment discrimina-
tion,' 3 constitutional immunities,' 4 and exhaustion of remedies. 15
rather than its certiorari, jurisdiction was invoked, it was required to "deal with [the] merits," id.
at 344, and its summary affirmance, or dismissal for want of a substantial federal question, was an
adjudication binding upon the lower federal courts. Id. at 344-45. While this rule has been
sharply criticized, see Colorado Springs Amusements, Ltd. v. Rizzo, 428 U.S. 913 (1976) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), it remains applicable to all questions actually raised
in the appeal to the Supreme Court. Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173 (1977).
In contrast with the broad discretionary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the courts of ap-
peals have only limited power to choose those cases which they will decide on the merits. With
the exception of interlocutory appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1977), see Coopers &
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 475-76 (1978), and appeals in habeas corpus cases by state
prisoners where the district court has refused to certify that there is probable cause to appeal, 28
U.S.C. § 2253 (1977), a court of appeals lacks the power to decide which cases it will decide on the
merits. Garrison v. Patterson, 391 U.S. 464 (1968).
The "non-precedential" aspect of 7TH CIR. R. 35 thus appears to be directly contrary to the
rule of Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975), that any adjudication by a court having appellate
jurisdiction is entitled to precedential effect.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1977) vests the courts of appeals with the power to promulgate "rules
for the conduct of [that court's] business." 7TH CiR. R. 35 goes much farther, with its impact upon
law book publishers, courts in other jurisdictions, and litigants. The contention that the rule is in
excess of the powers delegated by 28 U.S.C. § 2071 was raised but not adjudicated in Browder v.
Director, Dep't of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 258 n.I (1978). See Brief for Petitioner at 56 id.
8. The constitutional arguments are canvassed in Note, Unreported Decisions in the United
States Courts of Appeals, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 128, 141-45 (1977).
9. The one exception is where the court of appeals reverses a published decision of the
district court. 7TH Cut. R. 35(c)(1)(v).
10. This point was made by Mr. Justice Stevens in his speech at the Illinois State Bar Associ-
ation's Centennial Dinner, Springfield, Illinois (January 22, 1977), quoted in Reynolds & Richman,
supra note 2, at 1192:
[A] rule which authorizes any court to censor the future citation of its own opinions or
orders rests on a false premise. Such a rule assumes that an author is a reliable judge of
the quality and importance of his own work product. If I need authority to demonstrate
the invalidity of that assumption, I refer you to a citizen of Illinois who gave a brief talk
in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania that he did not expect to be long remembered. Judges are
the last persons who should be authorized to determine which of their decisions should
be long remembered.
II. The Seventh Circuit has disposed of cases remanded from the United States Supreme
Court through unpublished orders. See Comment, A Snake in the Path of the Law- The Seventh
Circuit's Non-Publication Rule, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 309, 317-40 (1977). Rule 35 has since been
amended. See 7TH CIR. R. 35(c)(l)(vi).
12. See text at notes 17-135 infra.
13. See text at notes 136-226 infra.
14. See text at notes 227-56 infra.
15. See text at notes 257-86 infra.
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Other civil liberties issues decided in published opinions also have been
noted. 16
DUE PROCESS
Several of the decisions which the Seventh Circuit chose to publish
in its 1978-79 term' 7 arose from cases in which persons claiming to
have been aggrieved by state or federal action complained that they
had been deprived of liberty or property without due process of law. ' 8
The threshhold question in each of these cases was whether the alleged
deprivation was the product of state or federal action.19 In those cases
where the jurisdictional question was resolved in the plaintiffs favor, 20
a second issue was whether the liberty or property interest involved was
sufficient to invoke the protections of the due process clause of the fifth
or fourteenth amendments. 2'
16. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Bowen, 600 F.2d 667 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3356 (U.S. Nov. 26, 1979) (No. 79-239) (right of municipality to limit charita-
ble solicitation); Wynn v. Carey, 599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1979) (abortion law); Trafelet v. Thomp-
son, 594 F.2d 623 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3239 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1979) (No. 78-1917)
(compulsory retirement of aged judges); Hanson v. Circuit Court, 591 F.2d 404 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 79) (1979) (availability of federal remedy for collateral review of state-court
fine-only convictions; issue reversed); Citizens for a Better Environment v. Village of Schaumberg,
590 F.2d 220 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 441 U.S. 922 (1979) (right of municipality to limit charitable
solicitation); Scherer v. Kelley, 584 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub nom., Scherer v.
Webster, 440 U.S. 964 (1979) (access to government files).
17. See note I supra.
18. For the purposes of this article, invasions upon specific constitutional rights, such as in-
fringement upon first amendment freedoms, are treated as deprivations of a liberty interest.
19. This is the conceptual approach mandated in Robinson v. Bergstrom, 579 F.2d 401 (7th
Cir. 1978), where the court held that the question of state action must be answered as ajurisdic-
tional matter, before considering any other issues. Id. at 404. For a discussion of Robinson, see
text accompanying notes 232-44 infra.
20. No state action was found in Musso v. Suriano, 586 F.2d 59 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 971 (1979), where the court reaffirmed the rule that government funding and general
regulation does not support a finding of state action. Similarly, in Gibson v. Dixon, 579 F.2d 1071
(7th Cir. 1978), the court applied Flagg Bros. Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978), and held that a
bank which repossessed an automobile after default of a loan which was secured by the vehicle
does not act under color of state law, even though the self-help remedy was authorized by statute.
State action was found in Robinson v. Bergstrom, 579 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1978), where the court
provided an affirmative answer to the question of whether a public defender acts under color of
state law. For a discussion of Robinson, see text accompanying notes 232-44 infra.
21. Even if there is no liberty or property interest, it appears that relief could be obtained on
proof of a denial of equal protection of laws. See Sterling v. Village of Maywood, 579 F.2d 1350
(7th Cir. 1978) (tenant has no property right to continued municipal water service once the land-
lord has requested termination of that service, but failure of municipality to restore water service
to tenant because landlord has refused to pay water bills denied tenant equal protection of law).
The same analysis was applied in Durso v. Rowe, 579 F.2d 1365 (7th Cir. 1978), discussed in the
text at notes 86-96 infra where the court held that due process rights may be found in official
practices and policies and that the district court erred in dismissing a prisoner's claim that "de-
fendants purposefully denied him a hearing before terminating his work-release status even
though hearings were customarily afforded to other inmates similarly situated." Id. at 1372.
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At one time, it appeared that the due process clause would be im-
plicated whenever governmental action involved "important inter-
ests."'22 Beginning with Board of Regents v. Roth, 23 however, the
United States Supreme Court has narrowly circumscribed the liberty
interests protected by the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 24 The
Court has limited to express constitutional 25 or statutory 26 or contrac-
tual entitlements 27 those property rights which come within the protec-
tions of the amendments. During the 1978-79 term, the Seventh Circuit
scrupulously applied these decisions in its published opinions.
22. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) ("Suspension of issued [drivers'] licenses thus
involves state action that adjudicates important interests of the licensees."). See also Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 86-87 (1972) (possessory interest in household possessions was "clearly...
sufficient to invoke the protection of the Due Process Clause"); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,
262 (1970) (termination of welfare benefits "involves state action that adjudicates important
rights"): Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 341-42 (1969) (prejudgment garnish-
ment was an obvious taking of property because it may "as a practical matter drive a wage-
earning family to the wall").
23. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
24. In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), the Court held that the liberty to work
is not within the scope of the fourteenth amendment. But see id. at 588-89 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing). In Roth, the liberty interest implicated in not renewing a public employee's contract was
limited to situations where the state employer had made a charge which "might seriously damage
[the employee's] standing and associations in his community." Id. at 573 (majority opinion). This
charge must be made publicly in order to trigger a liberty interest. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341,
348 (1976).
The liberty protected by the fourteenth amendment was further circumscribed in Paul v.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). The Court held that one whom the state has branded as an "active
shoplifter" and who consequently was inhibited "from entering business establishments for fear of
being suspected of shoplifting and possibly apprehended," id. at 697, is not thereby deprived of
any liberty under the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 712. See also Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal
Inmates, 99 S. Ct. 2100 (1979) (parole release decision does not per se implicate liberty interest);
Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438 (1979) (no liberty interest in connection with appearance by out-of-
state lawyer in criminal case); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976) (transfer of prisoner
involving significant change in conditions of confinement "not subject to audit under the Due
Process Clause").
The present scope of the liberty directly protected by the fourteenth amendment appears to
extend only to intrusions on the personal security of persons who are not under conviction of
crimes. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 534-35 & 535 n.17 (1979); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651, 673-74 (1977).
Not all members of the Court subscribe to this view of liberty. See Greenholtz v. Nebraska
Penal Inmates, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2109-11 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in part); Meachum v. Fano,
427 U.S. 215, 229-35 (1976) (Stevens, Brennan, & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
25. Cf. United States v. Bodcaw Co., 99 S. Ct. 1066 (1979) (limiting the compensation neces-
sary to satisfy fifth amendment in federal condemnation proceedings).
26. Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 99 S. Ct. 2100 (1979) (statutory entitlement to
parole release consideration); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 426 U.S. 1 (1978) (enti-
tlement by state case law to continuation of municipal electrical service when a bona fide dispute
exists about correctness of bill); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (statutory entitlement to public
education); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (statutory entitlement to "good time" cred-
its); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (statutory entitlement to "conditional liberty" of
parolee absent wrongdoing).
27. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
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Liberty Interests
The 1978-79 decisions of the Seventh Circuit interpreted the
United States Supreme Court's limitations upon the type of liberty im-
plicated in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. A lib-
erty interest is involved when police officers use excessive force,28 make
arrests without sufficient grounds,29 or do anything to deprive an ac-
cused of a fair trial.30 As required by Board of Regents v. Roth, 3 I how-
ever, the Seventh Circuit rejected claims of public employees that their
discharge 32 or nonpromotion 33 had implicated a constitutionally pro-
tected liberty interest. 34 On the other hand, a discharge from public
employment because of the assertion of first amendment rights would
infringe upon a liberty interest, 35 even when the speech involved was
internal criticism of a school administration. 36
Similarly, as required by Meachum v. Fano,37 the court of appeals
rejected liberty interests asserted by prisoners in deprivation of "good
time" 38 and in transfers, both from the general prison population to
segregated confinement 39 and from a work release program back to the
28. See, e.g., Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600 (7th Cir. 1979), discussed infra at notes 50-
71; White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381, 383 n.2 (7th Cir. 1979), discussed infra at notes 72-84; Davis
v. Freels, 583 F.2d 337 (7th Cir. 1979), discussed infra at notes 252-54.
29. Butler v. Goldblatt Bros. Inc., 589 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1978) (arrest Without probable
cause).
30. Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 632 (7th Cir. 1979) (prosecutor generating pre-trial
publicity which may have caused pre-trial prejudice against criminal defendants), discussed infra
at notes 50-71; Heidelberg v. Hammer, 577 F.2d 429, 432 (7th Cir. 1978) (destruction of criminal
defendant's legal papers and eavesdropping on that defendant's attorney-client communications).
31. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
32. Eichman v. Indiana State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 597 F.2d 1104, 1109-10 (7th Cir. 1979);
Paige v. Harris, 584 F.2d 178, 184 (7th Cir. 1978), discussed infra at notes 90-109.
33. Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793, 796-98 (7th Cir. 1979).
34. The current state of the law was thoroughly discussed in Paige v. Harris, 584 F.2d 178,
183-85 (7th Cir. 1978), and the pertinent United States Supreme Court cases were again analyzed
to reach the same conclusions in Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793, 796-99 (7th Cir. 1979). The
discussion of liberty interests in Webster added nothing to what had been said in Paige, and it is
difficult to reconcile these repetitive analyses with the Seventh Circuit's frequent use of unpub-
lished opinions. See note I supra.
35. In Eichman v. Indiana State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 597 F.2d 1104 (7th Cir. 1979), the
court treated the "free speech claims" that the employee had been discharged because of criticism
of the school, id. at 1108-09, as distinct from the question of whether the discharge had invaded a
liberty interest, see id. at 1109-10, concluding that discharge did not involve any liberty interests.
This analysis, however, overlooks the "incorporation" of the first amendment rights involved into
the liberty aspect of the fourteenth amendment.
36. Eichman v. Indiana State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 597 F.2d 1104, 1108 (7th Cir. 1979),
applying Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
37. 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
38. Arsberry v. Sielaff, 586 F.2d 37 (7th Cir. 1978). The property rights involved in Arsberry
are discussed in text at notes 92-99 infra.
39. d.
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general prison population. 40 Nevertheless, prisoners continue to pos-
sess liberty interests which implicate specific constitutional or statutory
guarantees. Thus, a prisoner who alleged that he been transferred from
one prison to another because he had, inter alia, complained about an
inadequate law library4' was held to have made out an actionable
claim.42 Similarly, a convicted murderer was allowed to proceed with
his action for money damages resulting from noncompliance with con-
stitutionally mandated extradition procedures.4 3  Liberty interests
would also be found in cases involving disproportionate punishment 44
or reckless disregard of a prisoner's essential medical needs,45 both of
which would implicate express eighth amendment protections.4 6
The contrast between liberty interests directly secured by the four-
teenth amendment and those which are "incorporated" from the first
ten amendments is illustrated by Hampton v. Hanrahan47 and White v.
Rochford,48 1979 Seventh Circuit cases which each resulted in major-
ity, concurring, and dissenting opinions.49
Hampton arose from a 4:30 a.m. raid upon an apartment allegedly
40. Durso v. Rowe, 579 F.2d 1365 (7th Cir. 1978). The property right which may be involved
in a transfer from work release to the general prison population is discussed infra in the text
accompanying notes 86-97.
41. Buise v. Hudkins, 584 F.2d 223 (7th Cir. 1978) (prisoner transferred from prison farm to
maximum security institution because he had been rendering legal assistance to other prisoners
and attempting to create a law library at the prison farm, as well as to create a "writ department"
and an "inmate council").
42. Id. at 232-33. The prisoner was not precluded from recovering more than nominal dam-
ages if he was able to prove that he had been wrongfully transferred from the farm. Id. at 233.
43. McBride v. Soos, 594 F.2d 610 (7th Cir. 1979) (liberty interest in compliance with extradi-
tion procedures created by U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2 and 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (1977)).
44. See Chapman v. Pickett, 586 F.2d 22 (7th Cir. 1978) (maintaining prisoner in segregated
confinement for seven months for failure to clean up work area sufficiently disproportionate to be
cruel and unusual, especially when prisoner's reason for failure to have cleaned up work area was
legitimized four months before release from segregated confinement by change in prison policy).
45. Green v. Carlson, 581 F.2d 689 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 2880 (1979) (delib-
erate indifference to medical needs resulting in death of prisoner). Green is also of interest for its
holding that the state survivorship rule would not be applied to deny a remedy when the alleged
wrongdoing had caused death. See id. at 692-95, distinguishing and analyzing Robertson v.
Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978).
46. The liberty interests protected by the fourteenth amendment were not at issue in these
cases because the alleged wrongdoing had been committed by federal officials, without any in-
volvement by a state. The court's analysis was therefore limited to the specific constitutional pro-
tections of the eighth amendment. It is obvious, however, that the same analysis would be applied
to "incorporate" the eighth amendment protections into the liberty interest of the fourteenth
amendment in a case involving alleged wrongdoing by state officials.
47. 600 F.2d 600 (7th Cir. 1979).
48. 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979).
49. A careful reading of all three opinions is required in each case to discern the actual
decision of the court. For example, in Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600 (7th Cir. 1979), the
majority opinion of Judge Swygert directed that sanctions be imposed on remand for noncompli-
ance with pre-trial discovery orders. Id. at 642. Judge Pell, dissenting in part, was of the opinion
that sanctions should not be imposed, id. at 656, and joined with concurring Chief Judge
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used by the Black Panther Party to store weapons.50 Two of the occu-
pants of the apartment were killed during the raid,51 and the seven sur-
viving occupants-four of whom required hospitalization 52-were held
for various state criminal charges which were subsequently dismissed.
53
The case was before the Seventh Circuit on appeal from the dis-
trict court's grant of directed verdicts at the close of an eighteen-month
jury trial.54 At issue were the claims of the survivors and the personal
representatives of the two persons killed during the raid for.money
damages for injuries sustained before, during, and after the raid.55
The constitutional injury contended in the case arose from the al-
legedly excessive force used during the raid.56 Plaintiffs also sought
damages for an alleged pre-raid conspiracy to interfere with the first
amendment rights of the Black Panther Party, 57 and for the post-raid
injuries resulting from the alleged cover-up of the "true facts" 58 about
the raid.59 In its analysis of the "cover-up claim" the Seventh Circuit
Fairchild, id. at 649 and 656, in directing the district court to give consideration to the question of
sanctions.
50. Id. at 605. The private arsenal consisted of "19 unregistered weapons, including 12 shot-
guns and rifles, among which were a stolen Chicago Police Department riot gun and 2 sawed-off
shotguns, 7 handguns and several hundred rounds of ammunition." Id. at 655 (Pell, J., dissenting
in part).
51. Id. at 605. The manner in which the deaths came about was unresolved. Defendants
offered evidence to show that the occupants of the apartment had fired first, id. at 614, while the
surviving occupants of the apartment each testified that none of the survivors had fired a gun
during the raid. Id. at 625. The plaintiffs also presented evidence to show that Fred Hampton,
one of the persons killed during the raid, had been drugged by a paid informant, id. at 614 n. 15,
and then shot deliberatedly by the raiders. Id. at 625.
52. Id. at 616.
53. The survivors were charged with attempted murder, aggravated battery and unlawful use
of weapons. Id. The indictments were dismissed when it became clear that no physical evidence
was available to corroborate the raiders' version of the incident, id. at 619-20, and in an attempt to
avoid federal indictments of the raiders for civil rights violations. The federal grand jury returned
no indictments against the raiders. Id. at 620. A Cook County *grand jury was convened to con-
sider the evidence against the raiders and returned indictments for conspiring to obstruct justice.
Id. at 618-20. The raiders were acquitted in a bench trial. Id. at 620.
54. Id. at 606. Also on appeal were two contempt judgments which arose from bizarre cir-
cumstances. Id. at 644-48. The case had previously been before the Seventh Circuit on appeal
from the district court's granting of a motion to dismiss against all defendants other than those
who had individually participated in the raid. Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602 (7th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974).
55. In addition to the persons who individually participated in the raid, the defendants in-
cluded the State's Attorney of Cook County, several of his assistants, several federal law enforce-
ment agents, and various Chicago police officers who allegedly participated in the "cover-up."
600 F.2d at 606-07.
56. Id. at 623-24, 635 n.35 (Swygert, J.); id. at 648 (Fairchild, C.J., concurring); id. at 660
(Pell, J., concurring in part).
57. Id. at 635 n.33 (Swygert, J.); id. at 648 (Fairchild, C.J., concurring).
58. Id. at 632.
59. The alleged coverup was intended to spread a "distorted, if not false, account of the raid
which justified the officers' actions." Id. at 627.
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appears to have recognized a new liberty interest.
Part of the alleged cover-up was press conferences held by defend-
ant Edward Hanrahan, then Cook County State's Attorney, to publi-
cize what were claimed to be false statements about the raid, casting the
survivors of the raid in a bad light.60  In the same vein, Hanrahan
staged a re-enactment of the raid for television broadcast to support the
propriety of the raiders' conduct.6'
Although this media publicity placed the survivors of the raid in
what may have been an unjustified bad light, no liberty interest would
have been implicated 62 -but for the fact that the survivors were then
facing state criminal charges.63 As such, the survivors were entitled to
an opportunity to prove that the media publicity would have impaired
their right to a fair trial, 64 and thereby obtain at least nominal dam-
ages. 65
Hampton thus provides a significant remedy to a person who is
convicted of a crime, has his conviction reversed because of prejudicial
publicity created by the prosecutor, and then is subsequently acquitted
at a new trial.66 In Hampton, however, the criminal prosecutions were
dismissed without any trial.67 It might well be, as Judge Pell stated in
his dissenting opinion, 68 that Hampton was being prosecuted "to
demonstrate the existence of a widespread and sinister conspiracy
among top law enforcement officials, state and federal."'69 If this is so,
it is of little significance: One of the interests protected by the due
process clause is the individual's "feeling that the government has dealt
60. Id. at 616-17, 627-28, 632.
61. Id. at 616-17.
62. Id. at 649 (Fairchild, C.J., concurring), citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976).
63. 600 F.2d at 616 ("Despite further potential pre-trial prejudice to the survivors' criminal
defense, Hanrahan continued to publicize the incident and decided to employ additional media
tactics to promote the raiders' version of the incident.").
64. An accused's right to a fair trial is secured by the sixth amendment, as "incorporated"
into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384
U.S. 333, 362 (1966) ("Due process requires that the accused receive a trial by an impartial jury
free from outside influences.").
65. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
66. At least under the circumstances of Hampton, the prosecutor would not be immune for
these injuries. See 600 F.2d at 632 (Swygert, J.); id. at 649 (Fairchild, C.J., concurring). Immuni-
ties are discussed infra in the text at notes 227-56.
67. The state criminal indictments were dismissed, 600 F.2d at 620, apparently as the result
of an agreement between the state prosecutor and the federal prosecutors conducting a grand jury
investigation of alleged civil rights violations which may have been committed in the course of the
raid.
68. Id. at 649-67. Judge Pell was especially critical of the intemperance of the attorneys for
several of the plaintiffs. Id. at 650-53.
69. Id. at 650 (Pell, J., dissenting in part).
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with him fairly," 70 and if the plaintiffs in Hampton chose to pursue this
aspect of the case at the expense of their claims for substantial money
damages, 7' such is their right.
A lack of fair dealing by the government was the basis for the
Seventh Circuit's decision in White v. Rochford.72 There, three chil-
dren had been riding in an automobile driven by their uncle, who was
arrested for drag racing.73 The complaint, filed on behalf of two of the
three children, 74 alleged that the arresting officers took the uncle into
custody and over his protests abandoned the three children with the
automobile, resulting in mental pain and anguish.75  On an appeal
from the district court's order granting a motion to dismiss, the sole
question before the Seventh Circuit was the legal sufficiency of the
complaint. In three opinions, 76 a divided panel reversed and remanded
for trial.77
A sharp cry of outrage at the officers' conduct permeates the opin-
ion of Judge Sprecher, which apparently was intended to be the major-
ity opinion.78 Starting with the proposition that the liberty interests
protected by the fourteenth amendment center "to some degree on bod-
ily integrity, '79 Judge Sprecher concluded that the failure of the arrest-
ing officers to have considered the welfare of the three children within
the automobile amounted to gross negligence. 80
70. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 262 (1978).
71. 600 F.2d at 650 (Pell, J., dissenting in part).
72. 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979).
73. Id. at 382. The record before the Seventh Circuit did not reveal the ultimate disposition
of the criminal charge, id. at 386, the legality of which was not at issue in the case. Id. at 389
(Kilkenny, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 382. The third child was not a litigant.
75. ld. On appeal, plaintiffs claimed that the police officers knew that one of the children
was asthmatic and would be especially susceptible to injury if abandoned in the automobile. Id.
at 385 n.8. Judge Sprecher noted that this allegation could be added in an amended complaint,
and assumed for purposes of his decision that such an amendment had been made. Cf. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1653 (1977) (defective allegations ofjurisdiction may be amended on appeal). Dissenting Judge
Kilkenny was sharply critical of this consideration which he described as "allegations raised as an
afterthought on appeal." 592 F.2d at 393 (Kilkenny, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 382-86 (Sprecher, J.); id. at 386-88 (Tone, J., concurring); id. at 388-95 (Kilkenny,
J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 386. The court affirmed dismissal of the superintendent of the police department
whose personal involvement in the incident had not been alleged and whose dismissal was not
contested by plaintiffs.
78. This assumption is based on a reading of Judge Kilkenny's dissent, which suggests that it
was prepared in response to Judge Sprecher's opinion, and then modified and supplemented when
circulation of the dissent resulted in Judge Tone's concurring opinion.
79. 592 F.2d at 383.
80. Id. at 385.
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Dissenting Judge Kilkenny8' would have affirmed dismissal of the
case on the ground that the officers had no duty to the children within
the car.8 2 Such a duty was obvious to Judge Tone, however, who in his
concurring opinion succinctly pointed out that the officers' duty was to
refrain from infringing upon the "federally protected right [of the chil-
dren] to be free from unjustified intrusions on their personal secur-
ity."8 3 As analyzed by Judge Tone, the officers infringed upon this
right when they arrested the only adult occupant of the car without
providing alternative protection for the children, thereby exposing
them "to danger as occupants of an immobilized car on a highspeed
expressway and to the cold."'8 4
The decision in White reaffirms the role of the liberty interest pro-
tected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment in estab-
lishing an individual's right to personal security irrespective of the
infringement of any other expressly guaranteed constitutional right.
With respect to the property interests protected by the due process
clause, however, the 1978-79 decisions of the Seventh Circuit illustrate
that the protections of the fourteenth amendment extend only to ex-
press or implied statutory or contractual rights.
Property Interests
Express or implied property rights were at issue in five of the pub-
lished decisions of the Seventh Circuit in its 1978-79 term. In Webster
v. Redmond85 and Durso v. Rowe8 6 the court respectively construed Illi-
nois statutes to reject claims of entitlements to promotion of a holder of
a "principal's certificate" to a position as a school principal87 and to
continuation of a prisoner's work release status, absent misconduct. 88
The court's analysis in these decisions reveals that absent state court
construction of the statute, the Seventh Circuit does not intend to af-
ford deference to the views of the district court regarding the meaning
81. Judge Kilkenny, a Senior Circuit Judge from the Ninth Circuit, was sitting by designa-
tion. Id. at 382.
82. Id. at 394 (Kilkenny, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 387 (Tone, J., concurring).
84. Id.
85. 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979).
86. 579 F.2d 1365 (7th Cir. 1978).
87. Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793, 799, 801 (7th Cir. 1979) (construing various sections
of the Illinois School Code, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 1 (1977)).
88. Durso v. Rowe, 579 F.2d 1365, 1370 (7th Cir. 1979) (construing the Illinois Unified Code
of Corrections, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-8-7(e) (1977)).
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of Illinois statutes.89 A similar result was reached in Paige v. Harris,90
where the Seventh Circuit construed the employment regulations of a
federal agency and concluded that a contractual entitlement to contin-
ued employment should be implied as a matter of law.9 1 In Arsberry v.
Sielaff,92 however, the Seventh Circuit refused to construe an Illinois
statute in the first instance, remanding that issue to the district court
and noting that abstention should be considered. 93
There was uniform recognition in the Seventh Circuit's published
decisions that the question of whether a property right had been cre-
ated by official policies or practices94 was in the first instance for the
district court. Thus, in Durso v. Rowe,95 while rejecting the claim of
entitlement based upon state law,96 the court of appeals remanded the
case to the district court in order to allow the prisoner to prove a prop-
erty right based on uniform practice. 97 Similarly, in Arsberry v. Sie-
laff,98 the district court was directed to consider in the first instance the
prisoner's claims of an established policy for earning "good time" and
the imposition of segregated confinement only upon evidence of serious
misconduct.99
The only novel aspect of these property right decisions is the relief
mandated in Paige v. Harris. 100 There, the Seventh Circuit held that an
attorney employed for twenty years by the Department of Housing and
89. There is no mention of the reasoning of the district court, Webster v. Redmond, 443 F.
Supp. 670 (N.D. 111. 1978), which was reversed in Webster, 599 F.2d at 803.
90. 584 F.2d 178 (7th Cir. 1978).
91. Id. at 182-83.
92. 586 F.2d 37 (7th Cir. 1978).
93. Id. at 48 n.6. While the court stated that it was making "no suggestion that this issue is or
is not an appropriate issue calling for abstention," id., the footnote devoted to this issue is reminis-
cent of "telling them not to think of a white bear." Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 345 (1978)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
94. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601-03 (1972).
95. 579 F.2d 1365 (7th Cir. 1978).
96. The Seventh Circuit's construction of ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-8-7 (1977), is not
beyond question. The statute requires a hearing in "disciplinary cases which may involve . . a
change in work, education, or other program assignment." Id. § 1003-8-7(e). The Seventh Circuit
agreed that the case involved a change in work, 579 F.2d at 1370, and remanded for determination
of whether the transfer at issue was for disciplinary reasons, id. at 1373, apparently because it had
been made after adverse newspaper publicity. A fairer reading of the statute would be to construe
it as prohibiting "a change in work, education, or other program assignment" which disadvantages
the prisoner for other than disciplinary reasons. This apparently is the view of the Illinois Depart-
ment of Corrections, which promulgated a regulation setting out a detailed procedure for notice
and hearing prior to any decision to revoke work-release status subsequent to the removal of
Durso from work-release. Id. at 1370 n.4. The Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court and
refused to afford any weight to this construction of the statute. Id.
97. Id. at 1371.
98. 586 F.2d 37 (7th Cir. 1978).
99. Id. at 47.
100. 584 F.2d 178 (7th Cir. 1978).
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Urban Affairs should not have been discharged summarily, and di-
rected that there be a trial in the district court to determine if the dis-
charge had been without just cause.' 0 ' Although the court cited Arnett
v. Kennedy0 2 for its definition of just cause, 0 3 it provided no explana-
tion for this type of relief other than a reference to "the extensive con-
troversy which this case has aroused."' l
Generally, the relief granted when an employee has been dis-
charged without a constitutionally required hearing is to require rein-
statement unless an adequate hearing is held which reaffirms the
discharge decision. 10 5 In Piphus v. Carey,10 6 however, where the Sev-
enth Circuit dealt with an action for money damages from a denial of
procedural due process, the court held that a district judge could retro-
spectively determine if a due process hearing would have produced a
different result.'0 7 This portion of Pphus was approved by the United
States Supreme Court. 08 Paige v. Harris thus applied Piphus to a case
seeking equitable relief, and rendered more meaningful the judicial
remedy available to a tenured employee who has been discharged with-
out "the process which is due."' 10 9
"The Process That Is Due"
After it is determined that an interest is within the protections of
the due process clause, the question that must be answered is "the proc-
ess that is due." " 0 This was the question before the Seventh Circuit in
Rud v. Dahl' and Christopher v. United States Board of Parole."12
101. Id. at 185.
102. 416 U.S. 134, 156-59 (1974).
103. 570 F.2d at 185.
104. Id.
105. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972): "Proof of such a property interest
would not, of course, entitle him to reinstatement. But such proof would obligate college officials
to grant a hearing at his request, where he could be informed on the grounds for his nonretention
and challenge their sufficiency." Id. at 603.
106. 545 F.2d 30 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'don other grounds, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
107. 545 F.2d at 32.
108. 435 U.S. at 261 n.16.
109. A similar remedy is available to a person who claims to have been aggrieved by state (or
federal) action resulting from the exercise of first amendment rights. Under Mount Healthy City
Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), once the plaintiff has shown that the exercise of first
amendment rights played a substantial role in the adverse action, it was the government's burden
to show to the district court by a preponderance of the evidence that the same result would have
been reached "in the absence of the protected conduct." Id. at 287. This remedy was mandated
by the Seventh Circuit in Buise v. Hudkins, 584 F.2d 223, 229-30 (7th Cir. 1978) (acts ofjailhouse
lawyers), and Eichman v. Indiana State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 597 F.2d 1104, 1108-09 (7th Cir.
1978) (criticism of employer).
110. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485 (1972).
111. 578 F.2d 674 (7th Cir. 1978).
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Rud, which started as an unpublished opinion," 3 was a challenge
to the legality of the Illinois statute' 14 pertaining to adjudication of in-
competency and appointment of a conservator to manage the person
and estate of an incompetent.' 5 Although the case had been brought
as a class action,' 16 the district court had not reached this issue,' ' 7 and
this noncompliance with rule 23(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure was not challenged on appeal." 1 8
The challenge to the statute was two-fold: First, the plaintiff al-
leged that the notice served on him was constitutionally inadequate;' 19
second, the plaintiff maintained that no adjudication of incompetency
could take place in the absence of counsel for the alleged incompe-
tent. 20 Both challenges were rejected by the Seventh Circuit. The no-
tice was held adequate' 2' under the tests of Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co. ,t22 and the court held that counsel was not essential
to insure the accuracy of the fact finding process.' 23
The shortcoming of the court's opinion in Rud is the possible situ-
ation in which a person may be incompetent to respond to notice of an
incompetency hearing, but may still be competent to manage his assets
under state law. Judge Tone, in a concurring opinion, appeared to ac-
knowledge such a possibility by resting his vote to affirm upon the ab-
sence of any particularized allegations of prejudice from the
inadequate notice in the complaint. 24 The panel majority, however,
went further and held that "there are no set of facts that [the plaintiff]
112. 589 F.2d 924 (7th Cir. 1978).
113. 578 F.2d at 674.
114. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 , § 11-2 (1977).
115. 578 F.2d at 675.
116. The proposed class was "all persons adjudicated incompetent in Cook County, Illinois on
or after June 17, 1976." Id. at 675-76.
117. Id. at 676.
118. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) requires that a determination of whether a case may be maintained
as a class action should be made -[als soon as practicable after the commencement of an action."
See Peritz v. Liberty Loan Co., 523 F.2d 349 (7th Cir. 1975), where the court held that this rule
precluded class certification after a ruling on the merits.
119. The claim was that the notice "did not offer any definition of the terms 'incompetent' or
.conservator,' did not state on its face the legal standard governing adjudications of incompetency,
and did not specify the legal consequences and practical ramifications resulting from the granting
of the petition." 578 F.2d at 677. There was, however, no claim that the named plaintiff did not
understand the notice. Id. at 679 (Tone, J., concurring).
120. Id. at 676.
121. Id. at 677.
122. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). No mention was made ofCovey v. Sanders, 351 U.S. 141 (1952),
and its holding that notice to a known mental incompetent who is without the protection of a
guardian does not measure up to the process that is due for a tax forfeiture of real property.
123. 578 F.2d at 679.
124. Id.
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could prove at trial rendering the notice constitutionally deficient.' 1 25
Given this holding, it is incredible that the court initially decided to
release its decision as an unpublished opinion; a decision upholding the
constitutionality of a state statute can hardly be described as devoid of
precedential effect. 126
The procedures provided to the plaintiff in Christopher v. United
States Board of Parole27 were also held to be constitutionally ade-
quate. There, a federal prisoner had been granted parole, 28 only to
have the parole grant rescinded following adverse newspaper publicity
and complaints from the sentencing judge and law enforcement offi-
cials.' 2 9 The basis for rescinding the parole grant was "new informa-
tion" received by the parole.,board from a person who implicated the
prospective parolee in a robbery and a number of burglaries.' 30
In a decision annouficed prior to the United States Supreme
Court's evaluation of thed iberty interest present in the parole release
decision,' 3 ' the Seventh Circuit held that a federal prisoner "who has
been given an effective date of parole does have some justifiable expec-
tation sufficient to trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause." 
32
The "process that is due," however, did not include the right to con-
front and cross-examine the person whose unverified statements were
the basis for rescinding the parole grant.' 33
As Judge Swygert pointed out in his dissenting opinion, this result
does not ensure that "the fact finding process is as complete and relia-
ble as possible."' 34 The panel majority, however, appeared willing to
analogize the lack of cross-examination to the power of a sentencing
judge to rely upon hearsay statements in imposing sentence.' 35 The
125. Id. at 678.
126. The court's explanation for its decision to reissue its unpublished order as a published
decision is brief: "The court has subsequently decided to issue the decision as an opinion." 578
F.2d at 674. Thus, it is unclear whether the opinion was published at the behest of one of the
parties, at the request of "any person" as permitted by 7TH CIR. R. 35(d)(3), or by the court sua
sponte.
127. 589 F.2d 924 (7th Cir. 1978).
128. Id. at 925.
129. Id. at 926.
130. Id. at 926 n.7.
131. In Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 99 S. Ct. 2100 (1979), the Court rejected deci-
sions holding that the granting of parole per se implicates a liberty interest, see, e.g., Richerson v.
Wolff, 525 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1975), and held that any liberty interest must appear from the stat-
utes creating the parole system in question. Under the Greenholtz analysis, a federal prisoner has
a liberty interest in the rescission of an unexecuted grant of parole by virtue of the United States
Parole Commission regulations governing rescission hearings. 28 C.F.R. § 2.34 (1979).
132. 589 F.2d at 927.
133. Id. at 928-32.
134. Id. at 933 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 932. But see United States v. Harris, 558 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1977), where the
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result was that the prisoner fared no better than if the court had held
that his parole grant had not involved a liberty interest.
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
In its 1978-79 term, the Seventh Circuit decided a number of rou-
tine employment discrimination actions 136 which had been brought
under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.137 These cases are ex-
ceptional only in their continuation of the de novo review of the evi-
dence standard first articulated by the Seventh Circuit in Stewart v.
General Motors Corp. 138 Also, the court departed from decisions in
other circuits 139 in holding that the time limitations of title VII for the
filing of a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission' 4° are a jurisdictional prerequisite, rather than a
statute of limitations which may be waived by the employer.' 4 1 The
harshness of this rule was ameliorated in two subsequent decisions
which held that this jurisdictional prerequisite could be satisfied by an
EEOC charge filed by a third person. 42
The Seventh Circuit's most significant title VII decisions, Ekanem
v. Health & Hospital Corp. 143 and Burlington Northern Co. v. EEOC,'44
are each a step backward from the court's longstanding regard for the
Seventh Circuit held that a criminal defendant is entitled to deny and rebut hearsay allegations of
serious criminal misconduct presented to the sentencing judge. Id. at 375.
136. Davis v. Weidner, 596 F.2d 726 (7th Cir. 1979); Roesel v. Joliet Wrought Washer Co.,
596 F.2d 183 (7th Cir. 1979); Taylor v. Phillips Indus., Inc., 593 F.2d 783 (7th Cir. 1979).
137. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
138. 542 F.2d 445, 449 (7th Cir. 1976) (independent examination of the evidence to determine
whether defendant's conduct constitutes a violation of title VII). Compare with Dayton Bd. of
Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 417-18 (1977) (review of district court's factual findings in dis-
crimination case governed by "clearly erroneous" standard of FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)).
139. On statute of limitations, see Kirk v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 578 F.2d 814, 818 (9th Cir.
1978); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Reeb v. Economic
Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924, 928 (5th Cir. 1975).
140. Hereinafter referred to as EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) (1970) required that an EEOC
charge be filed within 90 days of the alleged discriminatory act. This time limit was changed to
180 days by the 1972 amendments to title VII, when the relevant provision was renumbered as 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(5)(e) (1976). The 1972 amendment applies to all charges still pending with the
EEOC at the time of the enactment of the law. See Electrical Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc.,
429 U.S. 229, 242-43 (1976).
141. In re Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings in the Airline Cases, 582 F.2d 1142, 1151 (7th
Cir. 1978).
142. Eichman v. Indiana State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 597 F.2d 1104, 1107-08 (7th Cir. 1979)
(filing of EEOC charge by third person naming plaintiff as person aggrieved by retaliatory actions
of employer sufficient to satisfy jurisdictional prerequisites of title VII); McDonald v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 587 F.2d 357, 361 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 385 (1979) (starting date of title
VII class action determined by first charge filed by class member, irrespective of whether or not
earliest charge had been filed by named plaintiff).
143. 589 F.2d 316 (7th Cir. 1978).
144. 582 F.2d 1087 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 1097 (1979).
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broad remedy intended by Congress in title VII.'45 Ekanem illustrated
the Seventh Circuit's de novo review of the evidence standard for ap-
pellate review in title VII cases and held as a matter of law that a dis-
trict court is powerless to grant interim relief when an employee has
been discharged in retaliation for the filing of an EEOC charge. Bur-
lington Northern dealt with access to the investigative file compiled by
the EEOC in reviewing employment discrimination charges, and held
that at least prior to certification of a class, information about an em-
ployer's general employment policies may not be disclosed by the
EEOC. Each decision is an anomaly which should eventually be cor-
rected by the en banc court or by the United States Supreme Court.
Ekanem v. Health & Hospital Corp.
The Seventh Circuit's decision and reasoning in Ekanem v. Health
& Hospital Corp. 146 is flatly at odds with the decision of the Ninth Cir-
cuit in Smallwood v. National Can Co. 147 Both cases were appeals from
orders of the respective district courts granting an injunction to title VII
plaintiffs.' 48 The Ninth Circuit applied the "clearly erroneous" test 49
to the findings of the district court,' 50 concluded that those findings
were supported by sufficient evidence,' 5 ' and rejected the challenge to
the sufficiency of the finding of irreparable harm' 52 on the ground that
the injunction had been issued in response to a statutory provision, dis-
pensing with any need for a further showing of irreparable harm. 53
In contrast to the accepted and ordinary approach to appellate re-
view reflected in the Ninth Circuit's opinion, the decision of the Sev-
enth Circuit in Ekanem reads almost as if the panel majority 54 were
145. See, e.g., Stewart v. General Motors Corp., 542 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1976); Sprogis v.
United Air Lines, 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971); Bowe v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th
Cir. 1969).
146. 589 F.2d 316 (7th Cir. 1978).
147. 583 F.2d 419 (9th Cir. 1978).
148. In Smallwood, a permanent injunction had been granted to a plaintiff who had been
improperly denied reinstatement by a union in retaliation for having filed a title VII class action.
Id. at 420. In Ekanem, a preliminary injunction had been granted, ordering the reinstatement of
one plaintiff who had allegedly been discharged in retaliation for his filing of an EEOC charge,
and prohibiting further retaliation against another employee who had supported the EEOC
charge, and who had initially been discharged but then reinstated by the company. 589 F.2d at
317.
149. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395
(1948).
150. 583 F.2d at 420.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 420-21.
153. Id.
154. Judge Sprecher, dissenting, would have affirmed the grant of the preliminary injunction
as within the district court's discretion. 589 F.2d at 322 (Sprecher, J., dissenting).
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deciding the case in the first instance. The unsigned opinion for the
panel majority 15 5 opened with a review of the proceedings in the dis-
trict court, which had included a five and one-half day evidentiary
hearing. 156 It is difficult to discern from the majority opinion the basis
upon which the district court had found a reasonable probability that
the plaintiffs would ultimately prevail on the merits. 15 7 The findings of
the district court are described only in passing,'58 apparently because
those findings had been adopted from proposed findings submitted by
plaintiffs' counsel.159 This denigration of the district court's findings of
fact was unjustified-even if findings are "not the product of the work-
ings of the district judge's mind, [they] are formally his; they are not to
be rejected out-of-hand, and they will stand if supported by evi-
dence." 16 0
The willingness of the panel majority to decide the case as in the
first instance is shown in its discussion of "Insufficient Likelihood of
Prevailing on the Merits."' 6' After articulating the legal standard for
proving a "disparate treatment case,"' 162 the majority analyzed the evi-
dence in the light most favorable to the employer 163 and concluded that
155. The panel majority opinion was announced per curiam on behalf of Cummings and
Wood, JJ., 589 F.2d at 317. No mention was made of the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Smallwood v.
National Can Co., 583 F.2d 419 (9th Cir. 1978).
156. 589 F.2d at 318.
157. The crucial finding, referred to in Judge Sprecher's dissent, id. at 322 (Sprecher, J., dis-
senting), appears to be that the company had a policy of "retaining and reassigning employees
who were performing satisfactorily when their jobs were phased out." Id. The district court ap-
parently concluded that the company had failed to provide a sufficient explanation to justify its
failure to have followed this policy for plaintiffs, who had been critical of the employer's person-
nel practices. This explanation for the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction, however,
is nowhere to be found in the panel majority opinion.
158. Id. at 318-19.
159. Id. at 318.
160. United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 656 (1964).
161. 589 F.2d at 319-21.
162. Id. at 319-20. " 'Disparate treatment' .. is the most easily understood type of discrimi-
nation. The employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in
some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment." International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
163. The panel majority's discussion of the likelihood of success on the merits contains abso-
lutely no hint of the basis upon which the district court had granted a preliminary injunction.
Instead, the panel majority discusses the employer's overall personnel practices, 589 F.2d at 320,
the length of time between the plaintiffs' 1975 EEOC charge and the 1977 discharge, id., the "bona
fide business reason" for phasing out the plaintiffs' jobs, id., and the testimony that discrimination
had not been involved in a decision to hire another employee for a vacant position. Id. at 320-2 1.
The conventional starting point for appellate review is to view the record in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party in the district court. See, e.g., Barnes v. St. Catherine's Hosp.,
563 F.2d 324, 329 (7th Cir. 1977); Aunt Mid, Inc. v. Fjell Oranje Lines, 458 F.2d 713, 716-19 (7th
Cir. 1972); George v. American Airlines, Inc., 295 F.2d 311, 313 (7th Cir. 1961); Lewis Machine
Co. v. Aztec Lines, 172 F.2d 746, 748 (7th Cir. 1959). Had the panel majority applied this princi-
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the plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden. 164 The district court had
reached the opposite result, but the panel majority provided no indica-
tion of what error had been committed by the district court. There is
no suggestion that the district court applied an improper legal standard,
nor is there a holding that any of the findings of fact made by the dis-
trict court were clearly erroneous. 165
The "independent examination of whether defendant's conduct
constitutes a violation of Title VII' 166 standard for review in cases
where the plaintiff prevailed in the district court 167 is especially inap-
propriate in a case dealing with disparate treatment, as did Ekanem. It
is a rare case in which an employee can obtain direct evidence of dispa-
rate treatment. Such claims are established, if at all, through inferen-
tial proof. It is the plaintiffs burden to present facts which support an
inference that the employer's actions "are more likely than not based
on the consideration of impermissible factors."' 168 The employer may
then show that there was a legitimate reason for the action, 169 a claim
which may be rebutted by employee evidence showing that the claimed
basis for the employer's decision is pretextual.' 70
There is no indication in the opinion of the panel majority that the
district judge in Ekanem failed to follow this framework. As Judge
Sprecher stated in his dissenting opinion, the district court "found that
the employer maintained a policy and practice of retaining and reas-
signing employees who were performing satisfactorily when their jobs
ple, it would have started its analysis of the likelihood of success on the merits from the same
point as Judge Sprecher did in his dissenting opinion, ie., with the finding of the district court that
"the employer maintained a policy and practice of retaining and reassigning employees who were
performing satisfactorily when their jobs were phased out." 589 F.2d at 322 (Sprecher, J., dissent-
ing).
164. Plaintiffs' burden was to show "a reasonable probability of success on the merits." Id. at
319, quoting Kolz v. Board of Educ., 576 F.2d 747, 748 (7th Cir. 1978). The panel majority held
that neither plaintiff had met this burden. 589 F.2d at 321.
165. These two areas delimit the task of a court of appeals: "If it concludes that the findings of
the District Court are clearly erroneous, it may reverse them under FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). If it
determines that the District Court has misapprehended the law, it may accept that court's findings
of fact but reverse its judgment because of legal errors." Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433
U.S. 406, 417-18 (1977).
166. Stewart v. General Motors Corp., 542 F.2d 445, 449 (7th Cir. 1976).
167. This standard has not always been applied in cases where the title VII plaintiff has not
prevailed in the district court. See, e.g., Barnes v. St. Catherine's Hosp., 563 F.2d 324, 328-29 (7th
Cir. 1977), where in affirming the denial of title VII relief, the court of appeals stated the ordinary
rules for appellate review: "We are not to redetermine the facts de novo upon appellate review.
Where the evidence is in dispute, the prevailing party is entitled to have it viewed on review in the
light most favorable to it." Id. at 329.
168. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 580 (1978).
169. See Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978).
170. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
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were phased out."'71 This policy had not been followed when the jobs
of the two plaintiffs in Ekanem had been phased out, 72 and absent any
evidence that the plaintiffs had not been performing satisfactorily, 73 it
was permissible for the district court to infer that the employer's dissat-
isfaction with the plaintiffs' involvement in pending EEOC charges was
the basis for their discharge. 74 The fact that the district judge made
this inference after he had listened to five and one-half days of testi-
mony 75 should entitle his finding to deference by the court of appeals,
especially on review of an order granting a preliminary injunction. 76
The panel majority provided no indication why it was rejecting the
district court's inference of disparate treatment. While the panel ma-
jority might have decided the case differently had it been sitting as the
district judge, this is not sufficient ground for reversal 7 7 under ordi-
nary principles of appellate review. The Seventh Circuit's decision in
Ekanem thus suggests to successful title VII plaintiffs that they must be
prepared to re-try their case on appeal, unless and until the court of
appeals abandons the "independent examination" standard for appel-
late review. 178
The alternative holding in Ekanem is of even greater impact upon
title VII plaintiffs: the panel majority held that as a a matter of law a
district court is powerless in the usual case to grant a preliminary in-
junction at the behest of an employee who has been discharged in vio-
lation of title V11. 179 This holding undermines the enforcement scheme
fashioned by Congress in title VII, and is based on a questionable ap-
plication of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Sampson v.
171. 589 F.2d at 322.
172. A total of six jobs had been phased out, and three employees were immediately trans-
ferred to other positions. Id. at 319.
173. Evidence of unsatisfactory job performance was apparently not presented in the case.
174. Questions of "design, motive and intent with which men act" are uniquely for the district
court. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S. 338, 341 (1949). See, e.g., Barnes v. St. Cathe-
rine's Hosp., 563 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1977), where the Seventh Circuit expressed its unwillingness to
interfere with the district court's "refus[al] to draw an arguably permissible inference of racial
discrimination." Id. at 328.
175. 589 F.2d at 318.
176. This was the standard applied by the Seventh Circuit in another appeal from an order
granting a preliminary injunction decided in its 1978-79 term, Preston v. Thomas, 589 F.2d 300
(7th Cir. 1978). That case concerned a "deadlock" imposed at an Illinois penitentiary following a
serious riot. Id. at 302. The district court concluded that "no emergency existed justifying the
continuation of the lock-up," id., and the court of appeals, noting that FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)
requires that "due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility
of the witnesses," id., refused to reject this finding as "clearly erroneous." Id. at 302-03.
177. See note 167 supra.
178. See notes 167-68 supra.
179. 589 F.2d at 322.
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Murray. 1 80
In Sampson, the basic claim was that a federal agency had failed
to follow Civil Service Commission regulations in its decision to dis-
charge a probationary employee.' 8' Before exhausting administrative
remedies, 82 the employee applied for relief from the district court, and
succeeded in obtaining a preliminary injunction. 83 The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, 84 ap-
plying "the traditional standards governing more orthodox 'stays.' ",15
This, the United States Supreme Court held, was error: "Use of the
Court's injunctive power, however, when discharge of probationary
employees is at issue, should be reserved for [the genuinely extraordi-
nary situation]."'' 86 On this basis, the Supreme Court held that the
showing of lost wages and claim of damage to reputation "falls far
short of the type of irreparable injury which is a necessary predicate to
the issuance of a temporary injunction in this type of case."' 8 7
Notwithstanding the careful limitation of Sampson to cases involv-
ingprobationary federal civil service employees,' 88 the panel majority
of the Seventh Circuit in Ekanem read Sampson as applicable to "Title
VII cases generally." 189 Such an application of Sampson is of question-
able validity. Sampson involved a contract for personal services and
the claim of the employee that the employer had committed a breach of
that contract. 90 This claim was at issue before the Civil Service Com-
mission, which was in a position "to weigh [the employee's] contentions
180. 415 U.S. 61 (1974).
181. Under Civil Service Commission regulations, a probationary employee may be dismissed
simply "by notifying him in writing as to why he is being separated and the effective date of the
action." 5 C.F.R. § 315.804 (1979). When, however, the discharge is to be "for conditions arising
before appointment," id. § 315.805, notice of the reasons and an opportunity to be heard are
required. 415 U.S. at 66. The employee in Sampson contended that her discharge was "for condi-
tions arising before appointment," and that she had not been provided with the notice and oppor-
tunity to be heard required by 5 C.F.R. § 315.805. 415 U.S. at 66.
182. Id.
183. The district court initially granted a temporary restraining order until it could hear the
testimony ore tenus of the person who had made the decision to discharge the employee. Id. The
temporary restraining order was converted into a preliminary injunction when the government
refused to produce the witness. Id. at 67.
184. Murray v. Kunzig, 462 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
185. 415 U.S. at 83-84.
186. Id. at 92 n.68.
187. Id. at 91-92.
188. The Court's opinion in Sampson is carefully limited to cases involving probationary em-
ployees who complain only that their discharge violates Civil Service Commission regulations.
Id. at 80. The Court stated that "[wle are dealing in this case not with a permanent Government
employee . . . but with a probationary employee." Id. at 81.
189. 589 F.2d at 321 n.13 (emphasis supplied).
190. 415 U.S. at 83 ("Respondent's only substantive claim ... was that petitioners had vio-
lated the regulations promulgated by the Civil Service Commission.").
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and to order necessary relief without the aid of the District Court in-
junction."'91 A preliminary injunction was viewed as disruptive of the
normal Civil Service Commission processes 92 and, absent extraordi-
nary circumstances, an improper interference with the government's in-
ternal affairs. 193
None of these considerations are involved in a title VII case where
an employee is not suing for specific performance of an employment
contract, but is maintaining a civil action to be "made whole" for the
employer's alleged unlawful employment practices. 94 The EEOC is
unable to provide any relief other than an attempt to conciliate the
dispute. 95 When, as in Ekanem, the time period allowed by Congress
for the EEOC's conciliation efforts has expired, 196 the employee (or for-
mer employee) has a statutory right to "seek relief through a private
enforcement action in a district court."' 197 In fashioning such relief, a
district court may employ "full equitable powers."' 198 Thus, in a title
VII case, an application for a preliminary injunction should be judged
by traditional standards governing more orthodox 'stays' without any
need to show a genuinely extraordinary situation to establish irrepara-
ble harm. 99 This is precisely the standard articulated by Congress
when it authorized the EEOC to seek a preliminary injunction "while
the charge is pending,' ' 2°° and there is no reason why a different stan-
dard should be applied after a private enforcement action is filed.
Until it is reversed by the en banc court or by the United States
Supreme Court, the rule adopted by the Seventh Circuit in Ekanem
means that persons aggrieved by unlawful employment practices in Illi-
nois, Indiana, and Wisconsin will be unable to obtain interim relief in a
title VII case absent a genuinely extraordinary situation. Such a step
backward from the remedy intended by Congress is regrettable.
191. Id. at 77.
192. Id. at 78.
193. Id. at 83 & 92 n.68.
194. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975).
195. The EEOC may also bring a civil action if it chooses to do so, after it has been unable to
secure a conciliation agreement. See Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 358-60
(1977).
196. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1976) requires that the EEOC is entitled to 180 days to attempt
to conciliate the charge and to bring its own action, failing which the employee may obtain a
"right to sue" letter, and file a private action. In Kamberos v. GTE Automatic Elec. Co., 603 F.2d
598 (7th Cir. 1979), the court held that back pay in a private enforcement action may not be
obtained for the time after the EEOC has concluded that the complaint cannot be conciliated but
before a "right to sue" letter is issued.
197. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 361 (1977).
198. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975).
199. Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 83-84 & 92 n.68 (1974).
200. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(2) (1976).
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Burlington Northern Co. v. EEOC
The Seventh Circuit took another backward step from the remedy
intended by Congress in its decision in Burlington Northern Co. v.
EEOC.20 At issue was section 709(e) of title VI120 2 by which it is un-
lawful for the EEOC "to make public in any manner" any information
which had been obtained by the EEOC in investigating title VII viola-
tions.20 3 The case arose after individual right to sue letters had been
issued and several private class actions filed. 204 The private litigants
sought access to the EEOC national investigative file through a sub-
poena duces tecum, 20 5 and the employer filed an independent action to
enjoin release of the information. 20 6
The jurisdictional basis for such a lawsuit is not clear.20 7 Section
709(e) does not explicitly create a private right of action,20 8 and the
Seventh Circuit's discussion of the sparse legislative history of the stat-
ute209 fails to reveal any indication of congressional intent to create a
private right of action.210 Assuming, however, that the Seventh Circuit
had jurisdiction to consider the merits of the company's claims, the cor-
rectness of its decision is far from clear.
In the view of the Seventh Circuit, the EEOC's ability to conciliate
employment discrimination charges would be undercut if private liti-
gants were permitted to obtain access to the investigative file.21' For
this reason, the court held that at least "prior to certification of a
class," 21 2 the EEOC could disclose only information "directly relevant
201. 582 F.2d 1097 (7th Cir. 1978).
202. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8 (1976).
203. Section 709 of title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(e) (1976) provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any officer or employee of the Commission to make public in any
manner whatever any information obtained by the Commission pursuant to its authority
under this section prior to the institution of any proceedings under this subchapter in-
volving such information. Any officer or employee of the Commission who shal make
public in any manner whatever any information in violation of this subsection shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than
$1,000, or imprisoned not more than one year.
204. Three potential, i.e., as yet uncertified, class actions were pending at the time the case was
before the Seventh Circuit. 582 F.2d at 1098 & 1098 nn. 2-4.
205. Id. at 1098.
206. Id.
207. The opinion refers merely to an "action to enjoin release of the information," id. at 1098,
and does not discuss the jurisdictional issue.
208. Cf. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 99 S. Ct. 2479 (1979) (Securities Exchange Act of
1934); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 440 U.S. 281 (1979) (Freedom of Information Act).
209. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. EEOC, 581 F.2d 941, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
210. The only reference to the legislative history of section 709(e) in the Seventh Circuit's
opinion is a footnote which recites that the section was contained in title VII as originally enacted
in 1964. 582 F.2d at 1101 n.10.
211. d. at 1100-01.
212. d. at I101.
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to the individual plaintiff's claims. ' 213
The court of appeals recognized that its decision would hinder pri-
vate efforts to negotiate and settle under title VII,214 but concluded that
this would be consistent with its perception of the intended role of the
EEOC to be "the primary means of insuring equal employment oppor-
tunity., 21 5 This construction of title VII is contrary to the retention of a
private right of action in title VII for "[an aggrieved person unwilling
to await the conclusion of extended EEOC proceedings. ' 21 6 Nor does
the Seventh Circuit's construction of title VII square with the congres-
sional recognition during debate on the 1972 amendments to title
V1I217 of "the enormous backlog of cases before the EEOC and the
consequent delays of 18 to 24 months encountered by aggrieved per-
sons awaiting administrative action on their complaints. 218
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Burlington Northern resurrects
many of the arguments rejected by Congress' refusal to restrict private
class actions in the 1972 amendments to title VII,219 and is a hindrance
to the implementation of the remedy intended by Congress in title VII.
Although the court purported to limit its holding to situations "prior to
certification of a class," 220 information about an employer's general
policies may, under McDonnell Douglas v. Green,22' be "directly rele-
vant to the individual plaintiffs claims. ' 222 Thus, while Burlington
Northern may be read as supporting a liberal application of the class
action prerequisities of rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
in title VII cases, 223 it increases the difficulty faced by a private litigant
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 1102.
216. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 366 (1977).
217. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
218. 432 U.S. at 369 (footnotes omitted).
219. In considering the 1972 amendments to title VII, Congress was asked by employers to
limit private class actions under title VII to those persons who were specifically named in EEOC
charges. See, e.g., Hearings before the Subcomm. on Labor, Senate Comm. on Labor and Public
Welfare on S2515, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 261-62 (1971) (testimony of Gerald Smetana). While the
Seventh Circuit recognized that Congress had rejected these arguments, 582 F.2d at 1101, it made
no mention of the fact that this issue had been settled by the United States Supreme Court in
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 414 n.8 (1975).
220. 582 F.2d at 1101.
221. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
222. The Seventh Circuit held that "[a]t least prior to certification of a class," information
obtained by the EEOC in investigating an employment discrimination charge which is "involved"
in a private title VII action-its test for disclosure under section 709(e)-"is only that directly
relevant to the individual plaintiffs claims." 582 F.2d at 1101. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1972), however, the United States Supreme Court held that information
about an employer's "general policy and practice with respect to minority employment" would be
relevant to an individual title VII action. Id. at 804-05.
223. Several courts have held that a title VII case may not be allowed to proceed as a class
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who has accepted the invitation of Congress to prosecute a private en-
forcement action. 224 As is true for the Seventh Circuit's decision in
Ekanem v. Health & Hospital Corp. ,225 further consideration by the en
banc court or review of the issue by the United States Supreme Court is
required to restore title VII within the Seventh Circuit to the remedy
intended by Congress. 226
IMMUNITIES
The 1978-79 published decisions of the Seventh Circuit illustrate
the immunity rules fashioned by the United States Supreme Court for
cases seeking money damages for the deprivation of federal rights.
Judges227 and prosecutors 228 are absolutely immune from suit, as are
officials who are involved in decisions to initiate administrative pro-
ceedings.229 An affirmative defense of "good faith" is available to other
defendants in accordance with common law principles, 230 although
such a defense is not available absent a common law basis or strong
public policy reasons.23'
Absolute immunity was afforded to public defenders in Robinson v.
Bergstrom.232 There, appointed appellate counsel had failed to initiate
a timely appeal on behalf of a convicted murderer,233 and six years
action absent a prima facie showing of class discrimination. See, e.g., Garrett v. R.J. Reynolds
Indus., Inc., 81 F.R.D. 25 (M.D.N.C. 1978). By holding that information about an employer's
policies is "not directly relevant" prior to class certification, 582 F.2d at 1101, the Seventh Circuit
appears to reject the need for a showing of discrimination as a prerequisite for class certification.
224. The Seventh Circuit was of the opinion that the ability of a district court to appoint
counsel to a title VII litigant, and the possibility that attorney's fees would be awarded to a litigant
who prevailed, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(l), 2000e-5(k) (1976), substantially alleviated the difficul-
ties resulting from non-disclosure of the EEOC investigative file. 582 F.2d at 1101. This conclu-
sion is difficult to accept--even if counsel is appointed by the district court, funds must still be
advanced to duplicate the discovery already present in the EEOC files, and the possibility of
obtaining an award of attorney's fees in the future simply does not provide an incentive for coun-
sel to duplicate work already done by the EEOC.
225. 589 F.2d 316 (7th Cir. 1979).
226. The Seventh Circuit acknowledged a conflict among the circuits. Compare Sears, Roe-
buck & Co. v. EEOC, 581 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (followed by Seventh Circuit) and EEOC v.
Joseph Home Co., 607 F.2d 1075 (4th Cir. 1979) (following Burlington Northern) with H. Kessler
& Co. v. EEOC, 472 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973) (disclosure
permissible).
227. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
228. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
229. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 515 (1978).
230. See, e.g., Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978) (prison officials); Wood v. Strick-
land, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (school board members); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (state
governor, state national guard officials); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (police officers).
231. See Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1, 14 (lst Cir. 1978) (social worker not entitled to good
faith immunity).
232. 579 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1978).
233. Id. at 402.
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elapsed before, with the assistance of new counsel, the prisoner was
able to secure an affirmance of his conviction. 234 The prisoner brought
a civil rights action,23 5 apparently on the theory that the delay in the
appeal of his conviction had deprived him of federal rights. 236
In affirming the district court's denial of relief, the court of appeals
held first that public defenders act "under color of state law, ' 237 and
then addressed the question whether the public defender is entitled to
absolute immunity from suit.238 Implicit in this analysis is the assump-
tion that a convicted defendant is entitled to a reasonably speedy ap-
peal. 239 The holding that public defenders act under color of state law
lays the groundwork for an action seeking prospective injunctive relief
if public defenders fail to furnish this right to convicted defendants. 240
The Seventh Circuit's conclusion that public defenders are abso-
lutely immune from suits brought under section 1 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871241 was based upon the need for "encouragement of free
exercise of discretion and recruitment of persons for public defender
positions. ' 242  Similar arguments were subsequently rejected by the
United States Supreme Court when raised on behalf of federal execu-
tive officials in Butz v. Economou,243 and the correctness of the absolute
immunity fashioned in Robinson is unclear. 244
The "good faith" immunities applied by the Seventh Circuit in its
1978-79 published decisions are less controversial. 245  In Chapman v.
234. Id. The prisoner was convicted in 1968; his conviction was affirmed by the appellate
court six years later in 1974.
235. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
236. 579 F.2d at 403. The prisoner alleged that he had been denied access to various prison
programs because of the delay and that he could not seek federal habeas corpus relief due to his
failure to exhaust state remedies.
237. Id. at 403-08. The court adopted the "instrumentality theory" of Chalfant v. Wilmington
Inst., 574 F.2d 739 (3d Cir. 1978) (en banc), to hold that "[tihe fact that the Public Defender is a
state instrumentality is sufficient to show state action." 579 F.2d at 408.
238. Id.
239. If, as the court held, it is not correct to consider the immunity question before determin-
ing if there was state action and therefore jurisdiction, id. at 403-04, it would also have been
incorrect to consider the immunity question if the plaintiff had failed to allege a denial of federal
rights.
240. Cf. Smith v. Twomey, 486 F.2d 736 (7th Cir. 1973) (state prisoner complaining of delay
in adjudication of direct appeal; dismissal upheld because of pendency of argument of state ap-
peal).
241. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
242. 579 F.2d at 409.
243. 438 U.S. 478, 504-08 (1978).
244. This question may have been resolved by the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Ferri v. Ackerman, No. 78-5981 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1979) where the Court held that an attorney ap-
pointed by a federal judge to represent an indigent defendant in a federal criminal trial is not, as a
matter of federal law, entitled to absolute immunity in a state malpractice suit.
245. The same is true for the court's application of absolute immunities to the official who
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Pickett,246 a prisoner sought money damages for violations of his first
and eighth amendment rights. 247 A good faith defense was available
for the first amendment issues, because the rights involved had not
been clearly established at the time of the wrongdoing.248 The same
was not true for the eighth amendment violation, which the court held
involved rights which had been clearly established since 1910, when the
United States Supreme Court decided Weems v. United States.249
The same analysis was applied in Buise v. Hudkins,250 where the
court held that the rights involved had been clearly established, thereby
avoiding a defense of good faith.25' A different immunity analysis was
involved in Davis v. Freels.252 There, the court was concerned with the
basis upon which a police officer could justifiably use fatal force, and
answered that question by reference to the common law defense for an
assault action. 253 Davis is of especial interest for its example of an ex-
cellent offer of proof of testimony by a ballistics expert. 254
With the exception of Robinson, the Seventh Circuit's 1978-79
opinions dealing with immunities break no new ground. The same is
not true for the exhaustion of remedies requirement fashioned by the
court in Secret v. Brierton,255 discussed below. 256
institutes bar disciplinary charges, Kissell v. Breskow, 579 F.2d 425 (7th Cir. 1978), and to prose-
cutors for acts done in connection with prosecutorial duties, Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600
(7th Cir. 1979), where the court found absolute immunity for acts done in connection with prose-
cution of criminal cases and good faith immunity for investigation and public statements. See
Daniels v. Kieser, 586 F.2d 64 (7th Cir. 1978) (prosecutor who allegedly lied to obtain bench
warrant), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 931 (1979).
246. 586 F.2d 22 (7th Cir. 1978).
247. The first amendment rights involved punishment, for the exercise of religious beliefs-
refusal to handle pork by a Black Muslim. Id. at 25. The eighth amendment violation consisted
of disproportionate punishment for the prisoner's refusal to handle pork. Id. at 27-28.
248. Id. at 25-26,following Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978).
249. 217 U.S. 349 (1910), discussed at 586 F.2d at 28.
250. 584 F.2d 223 (7th Cir. 1978).
251. Id. at 232-33.
252. 583 F.2d 337 (7th Cir. 1978).
253. Id. at 341. The standard adopted is that of 6 AM. JUR. 2d Assault and Battery § 161
(1963):
In a civil action for assault, the defendant's belief that the plaintiff intended to do him
bodily harm cannot support a plea of self-defense unless it was such a belief as a reason-
able person of average prudence would have entertained under similar circumstances. It
is nol necessary that the danger which gave rise to the belief actually existed; it is suffi-
cient that the person resorting to self-defense at the time involved reasonably believed in
the existence of such a danger, and such reasonable belief is sufficient even where it is
mistaken. In forming such reasonable belief a person may act upon appearances. In
other words, it is sufficient that the danger was reasonably apparent.
254. 583 F.2d at 343-45. In addition to presenting the opinion in the offer of proof, counsel
presented testimony by the expert to support a finding under FED. R. EvID. 702 that the expert
testimony presented "specialized knowledge" which would assist the jury. Exclusion of the expert
testimony resulted in a new trial. Id. at 346.
255. 584 F.2d 823 (7th Cir. 1978).
256. See text accompanying notes 264-86 infra.
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EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES
In Monroe v. Pape,2 5 7 the United States Supreme Court held that
state remedies need not be exhausted before a litigant seeks a federal
remedy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.258 This principle has been reaffirmed
in numerous cases, 259 notwithstanding complaints and innovative at-
tempts to fashion an exhaustion requirement in section 1983 cases by
the lower federal courts in response to prisoner civil rights cases. 260
The Seventh Circuit's first attempt to fashion an exhaustion re-
quirement for section 1983 cases came in 1976 in Bonner v. Coughlin.26'
There, with respect to a prisoner's claim that his property had been
seized by prison guards, a divided panel of the Seventh Circuit held
that there was no final taking of property as long as the prisoner could
pursue a state remedy through the Illinois Court of Claims.262 Rehear-
ing was granted on this issue, and the en banc court rejected this quasi-
exhaustion requirement. 263
The Seventh Circuit's most recent attempt to apply an exhaustion
requirement in section 1983 cases came last term in Secret v.
Brierton.264 There, without any citation to the rejection of an exhaus-
tion requirement by the en banc court in Bonner,265 a panel of the Sev-
enth Circuit held that a prisoner must utilize prison grievance
procedures before filing a civil rights action. 266 Even assuming that, as
the panel reasoned, its creation of an exhaustion requirement has not
been foreclosed by the United States Supreme Court,2 67 and putting
257. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
258. Id. at 183.
259. E.g., Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1975); Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 814
(1974); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 472 (1974); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 492 n.10
(1973); Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 251 (1971); Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416, 417
(1967); McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 676 (1963).
260. See, e.g., McCray v. Burrell, 367 F. Supp. 1191 (D. Md. 1973), revd 516 F.2d 357 (4th
Cir. 1975), cerl. dismissed as improvidently granted, 426 U.S. 471 (1976).
261. 517 F.2d 1311, aff'd in part on rehearing, 545 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1976) (en'banc), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978).
262. 517 F.2d at 1318 n.23 & 1318-20.
263. 545 F.2d at 568 n.7. See id. at 576-78 (Swygert, J., dissenting in part).
264. 584 F.2d 823 (7th Cir. 1978).
265. Bonner is cited only for its holding that negligent damage to property "would not state a
claim under § 1983." Id. at 829.
266. Id. at 83 1.
267. The Seventh Circuit discussed several United States Supreme Court opinions to "ex-
trapolat[e] . . . a non-rigid approach to the exhaustion approach." Id. at 828. This extrapolation
borrowed heavily from one of the dissenting opinions in McCray v. Burrell, 516 F.2d 357, 375-77
(4th Cir. 1975) (Widener, J., dissenting in part), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 426 U.S.
471 (1976). The analysis stops with Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973), where the Court
suggested that the question of whether exhaustion could ever be required in a section 1983 action
was open. Id. at 574-75. Subsequent to Gibson, however, the United States Supreme Court has
repeatedly made plain that exhaustion of state judicial or administrative remedies is not required
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aside the conflict between the panel decision and the en banc decision
in Bonner, 268 there are several flaws in the court's exhaustion require-
ment.
First, the issue was apparently raised by the Seventh Circuit sua
sponte after oral argument, 269 and was decided by the court upon its
analysis of the Illinois prison grievance procedure 270 as well as its con-
clusion that the system was "capable of providing [the] remedy [sought
by the plaintiff] within a reasonable time."' 27' On its face, however, the
grievance procedure does not provide any mechanism through which a
prisoner may obtain money damages.272 The fact is that on March 28,
1975, the Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections directed
that no further grievances would be accepted "relating to the loss
and/or destruction of residents' personal property," and that such mat-
ters should be directed by the prisoner to the Illinois Court of
Claims.273 The adequacy of the Illinois grievance system is plainly a
question of fact, and the clearly erroneous result reached by the Sev-
enth Circuit when it resolved this question in the first instance shows
the wisdom of the general rule that "factfinding is the basic responsibil-
ity of district courts, rather than appellate courts. '
274
Second, even if the Illinois grievance system provided a procedure
through which a prisoner could obtain compensation for the loss of
personal property, the grievance mechanism does not provide any
means for the prisoner to be made whole for all of the damages which
may have been incurred as the result of the wrongful taking of prop-
erty. For example, in Bonner v. Coughlin,275 even though the prison
had replaced the property which had been wrongfully seized, 276 the
prisoner was nonetheless entitled to seek damages from a jury for
mental distress incurred upon discovery that his property had been
in a section 1983 action. Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1975); Steffel v. Thompson, 415
U.S. 452, 472 (1974).
268. See note 262 supra.
269. 584 F.2d at 825.
270. The Seventh Circuit apparently limited its analysis to the express provisions of Illinois
Department of Corrections Administrative Regulation 845. See 584 F.2d at 831-32.
271. Id. at 831.
272. The regulation provides that the chief administrative officer (prison warden) and the di-
rector of corrections may decide what action, if any, to take in response to a grievance. See
ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION 845, § II(G), § II(N),
reprintedat 584 F.2d at 831-32.
273. Memorandum, March 28, 1975, Chief of Administration, Illinois Department of Correc-
tions to All Wardens (copy on file with the Chicago-Kent Law Review).
274. DeMarco v. United States, 415 U.S. 449, 450 (1974).
275. 517 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1975), aff'd in part on rehearing, 545 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1976) (en
banc).
276. 517 F.2d at 1314.
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seized.277
The Seventh Circuit's holding in Secret v. Brieron278 that the
prison grievance procedure is sufficiently adequate 279 to require that it
be exhausted is inconsistent with the court's opinion in Fulton Market
Cold Storage Co. v. Cullerton.280 There, the court was primarily con-
cerned with whether a section 1983 damage action was barred by the
Tax Injunction Act of 1937.281 After holding that the damage action
was not barred,282 the court turned to the question of whether absten-
tion should be required because the plaintiff had not exhausted state
remedies. 283 In addition to applying the general rule that exhaustion is
not required in a section 1983 action,284 the court observed that the
state remedy could not afford complete relief because interest and at-
torneys' fees were unavailable.285 Under this reasoning, the prison
grievance procedure in Secret is inadequate because it fails to provide
the possibility that the prisoner could obtain damages for the loss of the
use of improperly seized property or for emotional distress resulting
from the seizure, damages which are recoverable in a section 1983 ac-
tion.286 Thus, Secret is another instance where an unwarranted depar-
ture from accepted and ordinary principles awaits correction by the en
banc court or by the United States Supreme Court.
CONCLUSION
Only a sampling of the cases decided by the Seventh Circuit in
1978-79 have been discussed in any detail. In its published opinions,
the court applied conflicting standards in determining whether a prop-
erty right was created by statutes or regulations, 287 and in the title
V11 288 and prisoner civil rights289 cases the court announced decisions
which apply an apparently erroneous standard of appellate review to
factual determinations and fashioned rules which are of questionable
277. On remand, Bonner obtained a jury verdict in the amount of one hundred dollars as
compensatory damages. Bonner v. Coughlin, No. 73 C 1468 (N.D. Ill. March 30, 1979).
278. 584 F.2d 823 (7th Cir. 1978).
279. Id. at 831.
280. 582 F.2d 1071 (7th Cir. 1978).
281. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1977).
282. 582 F.2d at 1074-80.
283. Id. at 1080-81.
284. The court stated that there is "no reason why this § 1983 action should be treated differ-
ently from others where exhaustion is not required." Id.
285. Id.
286. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 264 (1978).
287. See text at notes 85-109 supra.
288. See text at notes 136-226 supra.
289. See text at notes 264-86 supra.
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validity. On the whole, however, the Seventh Circuit scrupulously ap-
plied decisions of the United States Supreme Court, and the few deci-
sions of doubtful validity presumably will be ultimately corrected by
the en banc court of appeals or by the Supreme Court.
